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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY ON PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS OF THE VIETNAM’S  
STATE-OWNED-ENTERPRISE EQITIZATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
By 
 
Nguyen Thi Mai 
 
 
Since 1992, Vietnam has adopted the ‘equitization program’ as one of the major policy 
tools for transforming a centrally planned and subsidized economy into the market 
economy. This study will show that the change of ownership structure has taken a major 
role in firms’ performance improvements in Vietnam. Although the outcome does suggest 
certain level of accomplishments, some additional factors such as poor management 
capacity, low transparency in finance, and imbalanced structure of ownership where the 
State still holds the major portion of equity do affect the degree of performance 
improvements. Qualitative methods are used to analyze the effects of the equitization 
policies for SOEs in Vietnam with additional qualitative research to probe into potential 
policy measures in promoting productivity and business performances. 
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Definition of Terms and Acronyms 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
- SOE: state-owned-enterprise 
- COE: corporate-owned-enterprise 
- LME: large and medium enterprise 
- R&D: Research and Development 
- IPO: Initial Public Offering 
- HM: Human resource 
- SBC: soft budget constraint 
- VND: Vietnam Dong – Vietnam’s currency 
- HDBT: Hoi Dong Bo Truong (Prime Minister) 
- GSO: General Statistics Office 
- CIEM: Central Institute for Economic Management 
 
Technical terms 
 
- Listing: action of making one firm’s stock/equity public in official security transaction 
centre 
- Externality: something extra (by-product) in production or consumption in which over-
consumption or under-consumption of goods happen.  
(David L. Weimer (2005). Policy Analysis–Concepts and Practice. Pearson Education 
LTD.) 
- Natural monopoly (also called technical monopoly) refers to situation where the power to 
set the price is created by the characteristics of underlying technology and market 
condition. 
(David L. Weimer (2005). Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Pearson Education 
LTD.) 
- Information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party 
has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance of power in 
transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry.  
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Doi moi (Renovation) Policy released by the Vietnamese Communist 
Party’s the Eighth Summit in 1986, Vietnam has emphasized the transition from 
centrally planned economy to the socialist market economy. Vietnamese economy has 
demonstrated comparatively high average economic growth rates ranging from seven 
percent to nine percent since the mid-1990s. Thanks to the magnificent performance in 
socio-economic stabilization, rapid export growth, poverty reduction, and human 
development, Vietnam is globally considered as one of the successful transition 
economies, where the privatization has been suite instrument as one of the core 
policies. By definition, privatization affects the roles and functions of state, market 
and sociopolitical institutions by shifting ownership from government to private 
entities. The privatization policy has been considerably essential for transforming the 
subsidized firms particularly and therefore, transforming the centrally planned 
economy into the market economy mechanism in Vietnam.  
Privatization was initially launched and enhanced by the British Prime Minister 
Thatcher and her administration at the very early 1980s in the United Kingdom for the 
state-owned enterprises on a wide scope with the purpose to transform the government 
through privatization (Balaker et al, 2006). With the optimal necessity to change the 
mechanism of economies, many transition economies had speedily ignited expansive 
privatization programs that formed the important element of markets to allocate 
resources at many central and local levels. Accordingly, the Vietnamese government 
launched this process in 1992 after the institutional renovation of 1986 Doi Moi policy 
for business reform, yet with very prudential grasp and deliberation to avoid the 
government and market failures or unfavorable outcomes, given the historical lessons 
and experiences from other countries in the world. 
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The Vietnam’s privatization program, officially named “Equitization Program” 
(Co phan hoa) has remained as one scheme of the State-owned enterprise (SOE) 
Reform Program for economic reform, where a government business enterprise or 
state-owned-enterprise (SOE) is a legal entity monitored by the governmental agency 
(state representative) to carry out trade or business activities. Equitization is defined as 
the transformation of SOEs into joint stock companies and trading company’s equities 
to individual and collective investors for the performance’s improvements of the firms 
(Government of Vietnam webpage, 2007). 
The privatization in Vietnam’s case is officially used and named as ‘equitization’ 
because its approach and implementation for privatized SOEs are not similar to any 
other privatization programs in several countries. Contrary to the purpose of 
privatization, with the aim at promoting competition, residual state ownership in post-
privatization period and the percentage of shares transferred to firms’ internal partners 
are quite large in the case of Vietnam. Moreover, the privatization generally functions 
as giving firm certain conditions and rights to sell ownership in a form of stock at the 
security market, whereas, differently in Vietnam, equitization implies that workers of 
the equitized company have more chances to get ownership of the company. 
Equitization is the process of privatizing or dividing one company into different 
equal shares/equities to stakeholders. The objectives of SOE equitization are to create 
new types of enterprises including a large amount of laborers, and effectively utilize 
the state capital of the entire society for investment in technology renovation and 
production expansion. Equitization of an enterprise functions to stimulate firms’ 
employees and capital investors to be legal owners. 
Equitization is considered one of the major policy tools made by the Vietnamese 
Government during the early stage of economic reform, which proposes to create new 
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type of enterprise to use the national capital and assets efficiently, to mobilize all 
resources of the entire society and foreign investment, and to secure the harmonized 
interests of State, enterprises, and laborers. Moreover, it aims to improve Vietnamese 
enterprises’ competitiveness and efficiency of business performance for the process of 
international economy integration.  
The fundamental differences between developed and developing economies 
utilizing privatization policy are summarized in the following table. Differences in 
markets, management and governance highlight different effects of privatization 
among developed and developing nations, which are shown through the sort of goods, 
capital and labor markets, and private property rights seem to be less well-featured and 
protected. Additionally, business operation to mutually beneficial is less covered, as 
well as government integrity less secured (Parker, David and Colin Kirkpatrick, 2005)  
Table 1: Commonly found features of developed and developing countries affect 
the privatization process 
Criteria Developing countries Developed countries 
Market 
competition 
Imperfectly competitive and 
incomplete markets 
Competitive product markets 
Labor markets Regionalized and sometimes 
ethnically distinct labor markets, 
with appointment through 
connections 
Organized and competitive 
labor markets 
Competition of 
capital market 
Under-developed capital markets Competitive capital markets 
Competition of 
management 
Management weaknesses and 
patronage in appointments 
Competitive managerial labor 
markets; institutionalized 
management training 
Protection of 
private property 
rights; standards 
of business 
Poorly protected private property 
rights; under-developed business 
codes of behavior 
Protected and well-defined 
private property rights; 
understood standards of 
business conduct 
Standards of 
probity in public 
administration 
Relatively low standards of probity 
in public administration in a 
number of countries, including 
cronyism and corruption 
Usually relatively high 
standards of probity in public 
administration 
Source: Parker, David and Colin Kirkpatrick, 2005. 
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Technically, the Vietnam’s equitization is different from privatization programs 
in the common Western sense that the Vietnamese government does not necessarily 
lose its supreme control and domination over equitized firm in the post-equitization 
period. Another remarkable feature differs from common Western privatization 
activation is that employees and board of directors of the firms acquire a large portion 
of capital or equity in the equitized firms whereas the external partnership is rather 
dominant in the equitized firms in other countries (Truong Dong Loc, 2007). 
The purposes of the equitization policy on the SOE reform are to improve 
enterprises’ business efficiency and competitiveness through ownership diversification 
in line with mobilizing capital resources from own employees and outside investors, 
including domestic and foreign investors, for advancing technologies and enhancing 
business performance. In addition, this program has some effects in keeping consensus 
of balanced interests among the state, laborers and relevant partners within each 
equitized firm. 
Nevertheless, due to uncertainty and inappropriate equitization application, a lot 
of equitized firms are still challenged by unsolved problems generated from 
endogenous and exogenous causes. Firstly, lack of timely and proper guidance from 
the Government toward the program’s purposes and enforcement; Secondly, restricted 
investment access opportunities for all types of investors along with firms’ accounting 
ambiguity, and budget constraints; the third reason is the incompetence of corporate 
governance in equitized firms regarding to the fact that responsibility and reliability 
are not adequately considered when having diverse owners with different perspectives 
and know-how in one single equitized firm. The fourth reason is the slow growth of 
equitization implementation caused from different authority levels and the enterprises 
themselves. Finally, the high stake of equity is still possessed by the Government in 
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most of the firm’s ownership structure while the insiders (managers and labors) and 
the outsiders (investors) take fewer portions of that in comparison with other countries, 
in which privatization policies have been pursued as well.  
When the firms are on the equitization process, equity and shares should be 
equally allocated by internal and external partners. However, in Vietnam’s case, the 
low transparency and moral behaviors still remains problematic thanks to the unstable 
and inconsistent management of the ownership and managing board. Many firms are 
seeking financial investment, and solutions for accounting and stock listing, IPO 
(Initial Public Offering) of issuing stock. A lot of SOEs were not well-prepared for 
privatization procedures such as public announcement of balance sheet, accounting, 
and financial transparency before listing in stock exchange transactions. One 
remaining cause is the hesitance as well as the incorporative administration of 
executive board which have been seen in many business sectors. In addition, the 
policy design, policy adoption, and policy implementation are still in slow speed and 
relatively inconsistent progress at the absence of consecutive actions.  
Those problems leave such negative effects on equitized enterprise performance 
with low pace and incapability of issuing ownership equities for laborers and listing 
stock in security exchange market as IPO – Initial Public Offering. Moreover, they 
lead to some risky effects on the society and community such as moral hazard, 
corruption, and embezzlement etc. Another effect is that some corporations or large 
firms have postponed the equitization application due to their internal and external 
difficulties and unfulfilled responsibilities or they have not met the requirements for 
the equitization process yet. 
Participating in the equitization program, the three main stake-holders as the 
beneficiaries of the policy play important roles in the progress. Every partner has its 
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own roles and responsibilities as well as becomes benefit recipient in this program. 
Understanding their expectation from this program probably help to study how well 
the equitization has been working and if the outcomes fit its given objectives or to 
assess the monitoring role of the Government in facilitating the process. 
Firstly, the most important beneficiary is the equitized state-owned-enterprise 
(SOE). On one hand, owners’ aspiration is the post-equitization’s benefits for their 
companies such as profitability, leadership ethics, better management, more 
opportunities of investment mobilization etc. On the other hand, they don’t expect the 
negative effects such as low transparency, abundance of unskilled laborers, and 
inequity of benefit. These SOEs also desire to “play” and operate in the fair and 
competitive market with the equal support and concerns from the Government for 
every type of enterprise. Equitized SOEs are motivated by the Government and the 
equitization policies determined by laws. 
Secondly, the Vietnamese Government is expecting to bring socio-economic 
benefits for the country, successful application of equitization process in Vietnam in 
terms of implementation and better result of equitized firms’ performance. In contrast, 
the Government fears that this Reform Program could impose the negative social 
effects on enterprise, employees and society as a whole such as unemployment, side-
effect of the policies for laborers in accessing their property rights. 
Thirdly, the Vietnamese people are the primary subject and beneficiary for every 
policy. The equitization policy is not exceptional, in which the public is able to get 
involved in purchasing and owning SOEs in progress of equitization which they were 
not allowed by law before. Equitization creates more opportunities of employment for 
capable people in the age of working, which brings social welfare and public benefits. 
From the Vietnamese equitization program’s stated problems and the situation 
7 
 
mentioned above, some hypotheses are listed to be answered below. 
1. How have the equitization policies in Vietnam been implemented?  
2. What are the changes of pre and post - equitization processes? 
3. What shortcomings and consequences remain after adapting the equitization 
policy in Vietnam? 
4. How would law-makers grasp remaining issues to make amendments for the 
policies? 
In sum, this paper desires to provide evidences that equitization policy has made 
some improvements in financial situation and executing performance of the equitized 
firms. Besides, the study will point out some significantly remaining problems 
challenging those enterprises. Therefore, the paper aims at evaluating the overall 
results of the Vietnam’s equitization program in both the pre and post processes and its 
limitations as well as weaknesses to determine the efficiency and the impacts of these 
policies upon the firms’ business performance to draw policy implications and 
recommendations to enhance the policy’s implementation in the process of enterprise 
reform in particular, and for Vietnam’s socio-economic development in general. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An overall and closer executive summary of comparisons between two stages of 
the pre and post equitization in Vietnam will be demonstrated with the aim at 
evaluating the implementation process of SOE equitization since this policy has been 
adopted and taken into effect. The study will explain the issue of efficiency 
improvement, which becomes more essential than ever for entrepreneurs to sustain and 
develop the competitiveness for their companies. Moreover, the abundance of labor 
force and the unavailability of skilled workers in the post equitization period remain 
the crucial difficulty for firms after being equitized, that unemployment affects social 
issues across the country because a prominent amount of employees would be 
dismissed by regulations after their companies complete the equitization schemes. 
Furthermore, the legal terms, administrative and other unprecedented constraints 
are determinants for decreasing the pace of the equitization proceeds such as sharp 
downturn of the Vietnam’s security exchange in the early 2007, financial crisis, and 
the incomplete frame of regulations of which there have been various adjustments. In 
addition, some external shocks also affected the speed of the program such as the 1997 
Asian financial crises, oil price shocks and 2008 global financial crisis. Besides, it is 
commonly believed that the unwillingness or hesitance in making decisions and 
incompetence of many SOEs’ managers gradually dampen the implementation’s 
progress and keep being steady during the past years.  
The prior research in Vietnam also shows the limitation called the informational 
failure of overlapping statistics about equitized companies nationwide. In other words, 
several bankrupt or non-operating firms have not been officially reported to the 
relevant authorized agencies about their status. Thus, still the registered firm number 
of those types of companies written down in relevant agency’s document was at 
9 
 
presence in nominal terms, leading to the overlapping and imprecise data for statistic 
agencies. Therefore, a large scale survey about post-equitized enterprise nationwide is 
indeed necessary. As a result, information asymmetries about companies merging, 
dissolution, bankruptcy, financial capacity, equity issuance, and human resources 
dispersal might be reasonably improved.  
2.1. Perspective approach and supporting theory 
This study takes the perspective that despite the performance improvements of 
the equitized enterprises in the post-equitization, the matters of labor force and 
financial management has become more complex and inconsistent. This originates 
from the incompetency of leadership or board of directors. In addition, the structure of 
ownership is not equally appropriate in terms of equity allocation and property rights 
in one single company in which the share proportion obtained by the State is still 
sustained at dramatic level in compared with other countries’ cases. 
Gary H. Jefferson (2006) indicates in his paper “Privatization and restructuring 
in China” about the changing ownership profile of China's large and medium 
enterprises (LMEs) sector from 1994 to 2001. The portion of SOEs and COEs 
(corporate-owned-enterprises) represented in the LME data set declines significantly, 
while the proportions of the other major categories of ownership types grow 
substantially. One approach to evaluating the implications of ownership change is to 
compare the performance of firms that are already established in one or another 
ownership classification. The five categories of firm performance, namely, labor 
productivity measured as value added per unit of labor; capital productivity measured 
as value added divided by the net value of fixed assets; profitability, new product sales 
measured by new products as a percentage of sales; and R&D intensity measured by 
R&D expenditures divided by sales. Profitability is calculated as the difference 
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between sales revenue and the production costs of sold output and, therefore, excludes 
certain taxes, pension payments, welfare subsidies, and other costs that are not directly 
associated with production.  
From Jefferson’s research, there are three implications coming from the results 
based on existing ownership structures for firm performance, which are of limited 
value for predicting the impact on a given firm of a change in ownership from state 
ownership to shareholding status. First, the differential quality of converted and 
unconverted firms may reflect selection bias, because the SOEs chosen for conversion 
may not be typical of the existing population of SOEs. If the chosen SOEs were 
above-average performers before conversion, any measured quality advantage of the 
converted SOEs may reflect simply the tendency to select higher quality firms for 
restructuring. Second, omitted variables such as managerial quality will lead to biased 
coefficients if such effects are correlated simultaneously with the dependent 
performance variables and with explanatory variables like the firm's asset composition. 
Third, following conversion, time may be required to adjust to new governance 
arrangements and to achieve efficiency improvements associated with changes in the 
firm's labor force, asset composition, and product mix so that gains ensuing from 
privatization may appear only one or more years after conversion. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) in their study declare that the main difficulty 
towards SOEs is probably the efficient methods to discipline the company for the 
owners. SOEs do face the disciplinary effect of capital markets and the threat of a 
hostile takeover. Moreover, the owners often fail to run the firm in order, partly 
because most decisions are based on negotiations, newly-set objectives are vaguely 
defined, and in the case of equitization, profits and efficiency are typically of 
considerably less importance in comparison with capitalist systems. The SOEs face 
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“soft budget constraints”, meaning that the ‘main’ owner-the state, bails them out 
when they are in financial difficulties. The result is shown with an increased drain on 
the public budget and increased inefficiency.  
From that point of view, one question is raised that “Is public or private 
ownership more likely to be efficient?” This question has induced a fair amount of 
debates in the literature on privatization. Specifically, the literature in this issue can be 
divided into two branches: the social view and the agency view (LaPorta and López-
De- Silanes, 1999). For the social view, public ownership has several more advantages 
than private ownership. In other words, SOEs are viewed as a tool capable of curing 
market failures by implementing pricing policy with social marginal costs and benefits 
of production into account. Additionally, SOEs are controlled by government to 
maximize social welfare and improve decisions of private firms when natural 
monopoly power or any externalities lead to a divergence between private and social 
objectives (LaPorta and López-De- Silanes, 1999). 
For the agency view, under perfect competition, more recent economic literature 
has taken a much less flattering view of public ownership and a more favorable view 
of private ownership. This concept stresses that principle reasons for privatization are 
the existence of information asymmetries, where one party has more or better 
information than the other. These asymmetries lead to power imbalance or inequality 
in transactions which can occasionally affect them to go awry. This is one of the 
market failure’s factors causing incomplete contracting problems. These problems 
include potential incentive problems, and severe insufficiency of SOEs (Weimer, 
2005). 
The social view is thus in favor of public ownership while the agency view 
supports private ownership. Both views are considered and weighed of having 
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advantages and disadvantages. This study supports the agency view for private 
ownership as privatization should be accessed to avoid market failures including 
information asymmetry, negative externality, and natural monopoly. Thus, that policy 
is essential to be suitably applied to any economies in the progress of transition. 
The economic benefit coming from the private ownership truly depends on the 
context. Whereas privatization can be expected to result in efficiency improvements in 
most cases, there are others where it might lead to social welfare losses. Economic 
theory predicts that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership given a 
number of assumptions (Fredrik Sjöholm, 2006). 
- No externalities in production or consumption 
- Not a public good 
- No natural monopoly 
- Low information costs 
Hence, the impact of privatization depends on the degree of market failure: the 
larger such failure, the less positive impact of privatization. What this means is that 
privatization will result in the largest positive effects when there is a high degree of 
competition in the economy. Such competition is delivered from a high degree of trade 
and foreign direct investment, and from a large number of domestic factors. By the 
same token, a high degree of competition can sometimes force SOEs to be relatively 
efficient. Moreover, it is less obvious why privatization should be expected to result in 
large efficiency gains if the market is characterized by natural monopolies or a public 
good (Fredrik Sjöholm, 2006). 
Fredrik (2006) also stressed that just as there are market failures, which will 
impact privatization, one should also recognize that government failures might result 
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in poor efficiency even in line with natural monopolies and public goods. SOEs are in 
practice run by politicians or by bureaucrats and are likely to serve the public interest 
only when that coincides with their own interest. Bureaucrats will often place limited 
interest on firm profits since such profits flow into the government budget. 
SOEs performance is initially contradicted by two major problems. Firstly, the 
firm’s purposes are not precisely featured rather than sometimes referred to maximize 
social welfare, which is confusing in definition and how to measure, therefore to 
precisely authorize and request responsibility to certain people. Secondly, the large 
number of SOE’s owners (the public) is the factor giving difficulties to define the 
contract and leading to abnormal and unexpected changes in the scheduled targets 
given to the firm.  
After being equitized, SOEs grow significantly and attract more domestic and 
foreign investment because of the open and encouraging policy mechanism for 
equitized enterprises. When firms are equitized, equity should be distributed and sold 
to insiders and outsiders as scheduled by the companies.  
Transparency in the executive board in most firms is not reasonably considered 
and the companies have been controlled by a minority of shareholders. One 
implication is that there should be involvement of some independent shareholders in 
the executive board to supervise its decisions. 
A lot of SOEs are not well-prepared for the phases of privatization process 
which consists of the announcement of financial balance, accounting, and financial 
publication transparency before being listed in the stock exchange markets. Another 
reason is the inadequacy of readiness for implementation which the enterprises 
assumed they have reached. That is the readiness and capability of coping with 
competitiveness. Once the enterprise is equitized, it receives no government subsidies 
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of bailout, or credits but only managerial training, policy and information resource 
support. 
About the corruption and other negative impacts of privatization, Osipian (2008) 
says that corruption in undergraduate and graduate education is known but not 
described theoretically. Decentralization and privatization of higher education and the 
increasing scale and scope of corruption in higher education in the former Soviet Bloc, 
as well as numerous other countries, urges better understanding of the problem within 
the context of socio-economic transformations as it touches upon issues of access, 
quality, and equity. The article also presents an overview of the problem of corruption 
in education and develops models of corrupt organizations in higher education, 
including the vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the vertical hierarchy. 
Possible potential structures of corrupt organizations are presented as forms evolving 
from the horizontal structures.  
Bjorvatn (2005) in his paper “Corruption and Privatization” makes some 
concluding remarks that corruption likely affects the outcome of a privatization 
process in terms of acquisition price and post-privatization market structure and 
therefore economic efficiency. First, the acquisition price tends to be higher when the 
governmental officials are highly corrupt than when they are moderately corrupt or 
honest. This means that the potential for embezzlement is typically higher when 
selling to the inside firm than when the assets are sold to the outside firm. Intuitively, 
the inside firm has to offer a higher price for the assets in order to compensate for the 
fact that it generates lower private sector welfare than the outside firm. Secondly, 
increased fraudulence for highly corrupt officials leads to a lower acquisition price and 
hence, a smaller potential for bribes. In other words, the more corrupt are these 
officers, the cheaper they are to buy. Thirdly, privatization in a highly corrupt system 
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is likely to lead to a less efficient resource allocation than privatization in a less 
corrupt system. More precisely when the government officers are highly corrupt, the 
assets are sold to the inside firm, and the post-privatization market structure will be 
characterized by monopoly. When the officers are honest or only moderately corrupt, 
the assets are sold to the outside firm, resulting in duopoly and thus a higher level of 
economic efficiency, therefore the corruption and economic inefficiency go together. 
2.2. Synthesis on privatization impacts 
The impacts of privatization on firm performance have been extensively studied 
in both developed and developing countries with transition economies over the last 
decades. 
The first impact needed to be introduced here is the government transformation, 
which means the changes for the whole economy in different aspects. This can be 
expressed that privatization introduces market-based competition into the government 
where it, otherwise, does not exist. Competition benefits the public by offering 
expanded choices, higher quality services, and lower costs. A lot of economies have 
been transforming the governments through privatization, of which, the approach 
becomes apparent through bureaucracies, sluggish economies, stifling taxes, and failing 
government programs.  
Additionally, intellectuals, policy-makers, and citizens were getting increasingly 
interested in market–based policy solutions to improve the efficiency and performance 
of governments. Moore (Reason Foundation, 2006) offers a concise articulation of the 
benefits of privatization: 
Privatization exposes things we otherwise would not see—ideas, processes, 
innovations in service delivery. Within government rarely is success adequately 
rewarded, and innovation and new ideas are often quashed. But when 
privatization brings competition, accountability, and a chance for customers to 
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have a say, then excellence and innovation are rewarded, and mediocrity and 
failure are penalized. 
However, the privatization programs in many countries are thoroughly studied to 
remain some prevailing weaknesses or shortcomings in the policy adoption and 
implementation. Thus, the governments may introduce the strategies and amended 
policies from these studies. The poor performance of the SOEs originated from a list 
of different factors such as unidentified objectives, limited manager capacity and 
budget constraints, all of which contributed to that deteriorating situation. The former 
factor was probably the main constraint on improved efficiency; additionally the 
government kept on bailing out SOEs in financial distress and even encouraged the 
banks to lend them money without collaterals (Fredrik Sjöholm, 2006). 
Lin (2007) proposes a new cause for the pervasive syndromes of soft budget 
constraint (SBC) in socialism and transition economies, which means the policy 
burdens on enterprises result in the SBC. The policy burdens imply little effort input of 
enterprise managers and thus a low effectiveness of production. Increasing market 
competition will make the SBC problems appear more often with the policy burdens. 
On the other hand, when a SOE still bears the policy burdens, privatization will only 
aggravate the SBC problems. In this case, a private company will need more ex post 
subsidies from the state than an SOE under the same condition. The results are able to 
explain some stylized facts in any transition or socialism economies. 
Pivovarsky (2001) reports that ownership concentrated by foreign companies 
and banks results in better performance than domestic owners’ ownership 
concentration. It is found that foreign ownership is associated with greater 
performance improvements than entirely domestic ownership. Walsh and Whelan 
(2001) document that majority outside - ownership firms outperform majority inside 
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ownership or state-owned enterprises. 
Lia and Ouyang (2005) in their research “Modeling privatization as a firm 
strategy in transition economies” say almost all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face a 
critical choice of methods and time to privatize. An SOE’s privatization choice is often 
complicated by the unique characteristics of transition economies. While market 
economies feature clearly and relatively stable rules of market competition and 
property rights, these elements are evolving and uncertain in transition economies. 
They distinguish between macro angle (economy-level) and micro angle (firm-level) 
privatization, and then develop an optimal timing model for firm privatization, taking 
into consideration a number of important parameters, such as costs, pre- and post-
privatization performance, uncertainty, risk considerations, and speed of post-
privatization adjustment. The article shows that the choice of whether and when to 
privatize is a function of these parameters, which are in turn influenced by both 
external conditions and firm characteristics. 
Hovey and Naughton (2006) show in their paper an analysis of the current issues 
in SOE reform in China, in which point out relevant empirical findings, and propose a 
strategic direction to face challenges arising in privatization program of listed SOEs. 
The literature implies that state ownership is often negatively correlated to the firm’s 
performance. On the contrary, personal ownership positively influences that 
performance. Other forms of private ownership are generally positively correlated to 
performance, with institutional ownership structure showing significant promise. 
Therefore, the divesture of state ownership would be recommended and could be 
accomplished after three or four tranches (An issue of bonds derived from a pooling of 
like obligations that is differentiated from other issues). The government could divest 
its ownership by auction to strategically domestic and foreign investors, and for the 
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next tranche, an auction is used for the broad populace through mutual funds. The final 
proposed tranche would be a distribution to nationwide pension funds to backup 
retirement plan.  
The case of privatization in Vietnam is somehow similar to the China’s case 
because both countries have the socialist institution and other features of background 
in economy, business culture and same time of establishment of privatization in the 
early 1990s. Briefly, equitization process of SOEs in China started with an initial 
concentration on small SOEs in early 1990s. The process continued with increasing 
larger in scale of firms and with increasing speed since 1998. In 1996, there was 
around 114,000 SOEs. Surprisingly, in 2003, this figure was around 34,000. The state 
ownership in the overall economy declined from around 41 percent in 1998 to around 
34 percent in 2003. By 2005, there were around 1,400 large SOEs listed and their 
market capitalization amounted to about 40 percent of GDP (Quach Manh Hao, 2007). 
The notable feature of ownership structure in China is that individuals are 
allowed to own only one-third of publicly listed form SOEs while two-thirds owned 
by the state or the institutions which are also state-owned. Equities of the SOEs are 
also classified into different groups, in which A-shares are taken and traded only by 
Chinese. On the other hand, B-shares listed are owned and traded only by foreigners. 
Oversea listings, including H shares in Hong Kong and N-shares in New York are also 
restricted to certain foreign investors. Therefore, it seems to be feasible to measure the 
performance of the equitized firms with this classification (Quach Manh Hao, 2007). 
The empirical findings from Quach’s study do not favor the achievements of the 
equitization in China. The equity market in China contributed little to financing firms’ 
investment, whilst there was a significant positive impact of loan finance. The results 
induce that the issuers increasingly use newly raised funds from security markets for 
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non-productive purposes such as repaying debt, purchasing other firms and 
supplementing working capital, etc. Moreover, public investors hold stocks for only 
short-term gains, making stock prices volatile and equity unstable source of external 
investment. 
Another finding is that firms with state ownership in the range of 41 percent to 
60 percent have tendency to produce lower profitability, probably due to asset 
stripping by managers or related officials. It indicates that the government indeed 
needs to introduce measures to cease such implementations before stimulating further 
privatization. This finding is crucial because it shows the effect of large state 
ownership in the firms. Besides, performance of B-share and H-share firms was 
inferior to that of the A-share firms as the result of reported accounting manipulation 
practices frequently performed in the A-share market and also inability of foreign 
investors to run their firms in the absence of minority shareholders’ rights. 
2.3. Methodology 
For the research methodology, the study uses secondary data consisting 
preliminary analysis, and secondary surveys for comparisons, where rational and 
adequate data selected from surveys about enterprise’s equitization proceed might be 
utilized for quantitative results. Research from several references of controversial 
opinions, debates, and arguments from entrepreneurs, economists, law makers etc. 
would be applied. Additionally, this research uses qualitative research to emphasize on 
changes of equitization process for SOEs and to note remaining problems of this 
implementation in Vietnam currently. 
This paper uses qualitative research to emphasize on changes of equitization for 
SOEs and to note remaining problems of this implementation in Vietnam currently. 
The method employs exploratory research to understand the history and the effects of 
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the equitization policies implementation; and descriptive research to provide further 
insights, to determine the research problem, and to make some recommendations.  
Exploratory research is conducted with literature research of conceptual 
framework, and officially published statistics to overview the history of policy 
promulgation. The descriptive research is also used with the comparative analysis 
method of the SOEs performance after privatization process to determine the research 
problem.  
Aiming at disclosing the process of adaptation and realization the policy during 
period from 1992 to 2008, this study examined law enforcement schedule and analysis 
of selected cases for situational assessment. Additionally, the researcher collected 
concepts and viewpoints from certain expertise, and SOE managing executives about 
the advantages and disadvantages of the implementation from webpage, newspaper, 
and journal articles. Conducting a variety of valid and reliable research methodologies 
under the framework of qualitative research, the researcher uses these methods to 
answer the research questions to analyze the disadvantages and challenges when this 
policy has been adopted into their own companies. 
There are some researches which conducted the similar methodology for 
analyzing the statistics and qualitative information. La Porta and López-de-Silanes 
(1999); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), in their study used the methodology of 
comparing the three-year pre-privatization to three-year post-privatization financial 
and operating performance; comparing the pre to the post-privatization performance 
measures. Their findings are sorts of profitability, operating efficiency; investment 
spending, dividend payments, and leverage are significantly improved following 
privatization. Employment opportunity also increases after privatization, yet 
insignificantly.  Additionally, the study finds that all the measures of leverage 
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significantly decline following privatization. Finally, the study reports that labor 
intensity (usage of labor or employees on sales and employees on assets) dramatically 
decrease after privatization. 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) used the methodology, in which 
compared the performance of privatized firms to state-owned firms, and examined the 
impact of ownership structure on firm performance such as sale revenues, labor 
productivity, labor cost and material cost were used as performance measures of firms. 
The paper is accountable and confirmed with credibility as a result of using 
realistic and practical analysis of policy design and implementation. This also provides 
the brief and intensive evaluation of the policy by using the comparison of pre and 
post implementation processes, and exploratory research method of performance’s 
consequences. Additionally, the framework used for analysis has been proven to be 
reliable by Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) who also used compared 
the performance of privatized firms to state-owned firms, and examined the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance. 
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Chapter 3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Overview of two phases of the Vietnamese equitization program  
Since 1992, the Vietnamese Government has set the equitization as one of the 
key policies for the nation’s economic reform by accelerating the government business 
company restructuring. This program would consist two phases to equitize all the 
eligible enterprises of which business performance, profitability and potential for 
development had been considered and investigated nationwide. The pilot stage is 
diverted to the proactively-selected enterprises lasting from 1992 until the end of 1995. 
The second stage is the expanded phase for widened magnitude of government firms 
starting from 1996 until present.  
The evidence shows that the number of SOEs has decreased significantly since 
the early 1990s. Notably, in 1992, the Government promulgated Decision 202-CT on 
June, 8th, 1992 on establishing and liquidating SOEs, and implementing experiments 
to convert state enterprises into shareholding companies, in which required all state 
owned enterprises to be re-registered or closed. Since that documentation, the total 
number of SOEs reduced to a half from 12,000 in 1991 to 6,200 at the end of 1992 and 
roughly 6,000 in 1994, especially witnessing the rapid decline at municipal SOEs 
across the country. Such a sharp downturn is attributable to around 2,000 mergers and 
3,000 liquidations of the SOEs (CIEM, 2002). The decrease of SOEs has kept 
continuing recently, as can be seen from the number of SOEs was 5,618 out of the 
total of 39,762 enterprises (less than 15% of the total) among the whole economy in 
the year 2000 (GSO, 2002). 
On June 8th, 1992, Vietnamese Prime Minister ignited and issued the Decision 
202-CT to launch the equitization plan with a pilot scheme. For the entire program, the 
Government targeted at 5,250 SOEs (around 85 percent) out of 6,200 state-owned-
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enterprises throughout the whole country to be the eligible enterprises which were 
mostly the small and medium-sized firms having profit potential, yet no ‘strategic 
enterprises’ such as Government Corporations 90, 91 and some national key industries 
etc. were the subject to this program at the first place.  
Since 1992, the Vietnamese Government has enforced the equitization policies 
by the issuance of a number of policy documents (Decree) for SOEs equitization 
program (Government Webpage) as shown in the following table. 
Table 2: Law regarding enforcement of equitization procedure 
List Decision Content 
1 Decision 202-CT 
(June, 8th, 1992) 
Implementing experiments to convert State 
Enterprises into shareholding Companies 
2 Decree 28/CP  
(May, 7th, 1996) 
Standardizing SOE equitization’s procedures 
3 Decree 44/CP  
(June, 29th, 1998) 
Encouraging equitized firms and laborers with more 
promotions and benefits 
4 Decree 64/2002/NĐ-CP 
(June, 19th, 2002) 
Promulgating policies on transferring SOEs to 
equitized enterprises 
5 Decree 187/2004/NĐ-CP 
(November, 16th, 2004) 
Transferring state owned firms to equitized SOEs 
6 Decree 109/2007/NĐ-CP 
(June, 6th, 2007) 
Transforming of 100% state capital enterprises into 
equitized ones. (The updated legal document) 
Source: Vietnamese Government Webpage 
During the pilot phase from 1992 to 1995, only 5 state companies were equitized, 
including small SOEs from the transportation, shoes, machine and food-processing 
industries. This limited number of enterprises in the pilot stage implied that the State 
was expecting to examine the effectiveness of this program when it was initially 
launched in the Vietnam’s economic circumstance within small size of state capital in 
order to minimize any potential failures or loss. Additionally, the Government and the 
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rest of prospective equitized enterprises would be able to earn lessons and experiences 
from the implementation of this pilot equitization for the next stage. 
The aim of this plan was initially to change the firms’ lasting distressed 
performance. Most of these eligible SOEs were so far run by old-fashioned technology 
or low level of research and development R&D activities, and ineffective use of the 
capital and assets. Besides, their financial capability was restricted in different aspects 
and on the request of the state subsidies; in other cases, several SOEs had been 
managed in the circumstance of capital and asset loss before the equitization and 
therefore, operated with low effectiveness and outcomes not as desired and scheduled. 
In most of those enterprises, the laborers held quite substantial portion of the 
total equities; however the state still owned almost 30 percent of the shares. Their 
capital and ownership structure in the pilot stage (1992 -1995) is described in Table 1. 
Table 3: Capital and ownership structure of the first five equitized firms  
 
Firm Name Capital 
(billion VND*)
Ownership structure (%) 
State Employees Outsiders
Transportation Service Co. 6,200 
 
18.0 
 
77.0 
 
5.0 
 
Refrigeration & Electrical 
Engineering Co. 
16,000 
 
30,0 50,0 20,0 
Hiep An Shoes Co. 4,793 
 
30,0 35.2 
 
34.8 
 
Animal Food Processing Co. 7,912 
 
30.0 
 
50,0 20,0 
Long An Export Product 
Processing Co. 
3,540 
 
30.2 
 
48.6 
 
21.2 
 
Source: GSO (2002) 
(*: VND (Vietnam’s currency): at this period, 1 USD = 15,000 VND) 
 From Table 3, in four among five companies, the state owned 30 percent of the 
overall equities. Workers of the equitized companies (board of director and laborers) 
held the majority of shares; hence, the outside investors took less chance to possess 
ownership of the company, apart from Hiep An Shoes Co. with nearly 35 percent. In 
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general, the state obtained the dominant stake of the company’s capital.  
The implication behind this was the state’s purpose of keeping the controlling 
position and superior rights in making decisions for the first newly-equitized firms’ 
operations. In addition, considering these companies’ large capital above, these firms 
were estimated to be potentially productive in the post-equitization, which could much 
restrict the government and market failures and set an empirical example for other 
publicly-owned-firms to make the next step. 
Concerning the necessity of a more comprehensive and intensive approach, the 
Government issued Decree 28-CP in May, 1996 to finish the pilot stage and set a new 
stage of the equitization process. This Decree kept some general principles of the pilot 
equitization program, additionally extended the scope of equitization to all non-
strategic small and medium-sized SOEs, and required SOEs’ administrative agencies 
(Ministries, People's Committees and State Corporations) to select any firms for 
equitization. According to this Decree, the transformation of a number of SOEs into 
joint-stock companies aimed at mobilizing capital from the employees and officials in 
firms; individuals and economic organizations domestically and abroad; creating 
conditions for the capital contributors and the employees in enterprises to own equities 
along with raising their role and giving a new impetus to enhance the enterprises’ 
business efficiency. The Decree also demonstrated that the ownership rights and all 
legitimate interests of the individuals and organizations that buy shares from the 
equitized enterprises would be protected by the State in accordance with current laws. 
However, since the enforcement of this Decree in May, 1996, the equitization 
process did not accelerate as fast as expected. Practically, only 10 additional firms 
went through the equitization in the 2 years 1996 and 1997 due to the slowly blocked 
procedure from the policy enforcement and indecisive and firm manager’s behaviors 
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in avoiding tasks and responsibilities. 
 
The following table displays the annual number of equitized firms and the 
accumulated number since 1993 to 2008 (Ministry of Finance, 2008). 
Table 4: Number of equitized enterprise (1993-2008) 
YEAR EQUITIZED SOEs ACCUMULATED 
1993 2 2 
1994 1 3 
1995 2 5 
1996 6 11 
1997 4 15 
1998 101 116 
1999 254 370 
2000 212 582 
2001 206 788 
2002 164 952 
2003 537 1489 
2004 753 2242 
2005 1032 3274 
2006 294 3568 
2007 116 3684 
2008 74 3758 
Source: Nguyen (2005), Ministry of Finance (2008) 
The equitization process has been accelerating since the promulgation of 
Government Decree 44/1998/ND-CP in the mid-1998. This Decree developed from 
the fundamental regulations of the Decree 28-CP with the content expansion. 
Ownership rights and all legitimate interests of organizations and individuals 
purchasing shares in equitized enterprises would be protected by the State in 
accordance with law. The sale of shares shall be publicly notified and carried out at 
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equitized enterprises or through commercial banks, financial companies and stock 
exchange departments and centers. Especially, the Decree emphasized on the 
employment issue of the firm equitization program in which, an equitized enterprise 
should be responsible for arranging for the employment of all the employees currently 
working for the enterprise. Employees who voluntarily terminate their labor contracts 
shall be dealt with in accordance with applicable regulations. The Decree provided a 
fairly complete and comprehensive framework for transforming SOEs into equitized 
ones. As a consequence, more than 100 SOEs have been equitized yearly following the 
issue of this Decree. Since 1998 until 2001, the number of equitized firms increased 
dramatically from 15 in 1997 to 788 firms in 2001 as can be seen in Table 4.  
Although the Decree 44 has played a substantial role in stimulating the 
equitization, it still has some shortcomings, especially regarding to the valuation 
methods for firms’ assets. As a result, the Government issued Decree 64 on June, 19th, 
2002 to replace the Decree 44 on transformation of SOEs to joint-stock companies. 
This Decree was expanded for strengthening the real ownership of employees and 
share-holders; also investor’s monitoring of the enterprise, as well as balancing the 
interests of the state, the enterprise, and the employees. There have been about 10 
major changes compared with the Decree 44 such as firm valuation methods, initial 
public offering (IPO) requirements, founders’ obligations, which has a strong effect on 
cranking-up the pace of the equitization process. Additionally, the conditions of 
purchasing shares were regulated in more concrete detail within this Decree, 
particularly the foreign investors.  
Regarding to the Decree 64/2002, foreign social and economic organizations and 
individuals (including non-resident Vietnamese and foreign residents in Vietnam) who 
were interested in buying shares of the equitized Vietnamese enterprises would be 
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required to open accounts at payment service providing institutions that are operating 
in the Vietnam’s territory, and observing Vietnamese laws. All transactions in buying 
and selling shares, receiving dividends and profit repatriation from Vietnam should be 
conducted through these accounts. Since this Decree, the SOEs had successfully been 
reformed in a rapid path, especially since the years 2003 and 2004. The rights and 
responsibilities of the equitized enterprises were soundly documented in this Decree, 
of which, the enterprises had the responsibility to arrange and to make full use of their 
labor force at the time of the equitization and to provide allowances for workers. In 
parallel, the joint stock companies inherited all obligations with employees transferred 
over from the former state-owned enterprises in using the existing labor force. On the 
other hand, they were fully allowed with the right to use all the equitized assets and 
capital for their business purposes, and therefore inherit all benefits and obligations of 
the former state-owned enterprises as well as other rights and obligations as stipulated 
by the Law. The subsidiary enterprises of the equitized state General Corporation 
holding dominant state shares (over 50% of chartered capital) remained members of 
the General Corporation (Government of Vietnam webpage). 
Additionally, the speed of equitization has been more rapid since the 
establishment of the Ho Chi Minh City Vietnam Stock Exchange in 2000. As listed of 
February, 2008, there were about 3,000 equitized firms being listed since 2000. 
Nevertheless, most of them were small and medium size while some of the large-size 
SOEs were scheduled for the program in 2007, but the process was seen slower for 
some reasons, including the slow speed of some corporations and the Government 
resulting from concerns and cautious awareness of the oversupply and sharp 
fluctuations in the security market (Quach Manh Hao, 2007). 
The updated legal frame for the equitization program is the Decree 
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109/2007/NĐ-CP issued on June 26th, 2007. According to this Decree, the 
transformation of 100% state capital enterprises into equitized ones is mainly focused. 
And an enterprise with 100% state capital must satisfy the two following conditions: 
Being not an enterprise where the State holds 100% charter capital; and, having state 
capital after handling of financial matters and re-determining its value. 
 This is the update guiding instruction, which substitutes the Decree 
187/2004/NĐ-CP on November, 16th, 2004 for transformation of 100% state-owned 
companies to equitized ones, which are required for these certain principles: Being not 
an enterprise where the State holds 100% charter capital; having state capital after 
handling of financial matters and re-determining its value (Appendix). 
Domestic and foreign investors may buy shares of these enterprises upon their 
equitization. A strategic investor may purchase shares at a price not lower than the 
average winning bidding price but may not transfer shares they are allowed to 
purchase within three years from the date the joint-stock company is granted the 
business registration certificate. Enterprises for which equitization plans have been 
approved by competent authorities before the effective date of this Decree shall 
continue executing those plans and comply with the provisions of this Decree. 
Enterprises which have registered business as joint-stock companies before the 
effective date of this Decree may continue enjoying preferences under relevant laws.- 
 In recent years, the efforts of promoting equitization process have been 
obviously shown by the establishment of the State Capital Investment Corporation 
(SCIC) which was incorporated under Decisions 151/2005/QD-TTg of the Prime 
Minister on June, 20th, 2005. SCIC is seen as a bold measure of the Government to 
boost the economic development and SOE reforms that are aimed at enhancing the 
efficiency of state capital utilization. SCIC’s primary objectives are to represent the 
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state capital interests in enterprises and invest in key sectors and essential industries 
with a view to strengthening the dominant role of the state sector while respecting 
market rules (SCIC webpage). Commenced operations since August 2006, SCIC is 
currently managing a large portfolio of over 800 enterprises that are operating in 
various sectors, such as financial service, energy, manufacturing, telecommunications, 
transportation, consumer products, health care, and information technology. This 
governmental business corporation functions to be representative of the State in 
holding stakes in equitized companies and settling equitization plans for other eligible 
large firms which have not been equitized yet in this progress until 2010, comprising 
the state commercial banks and other specialized strategic sector, the key industries or 
the state economic groups. 
The total number of equitized SOEs up to December, 31st, 2008 is 3,758, which 
is regarded as modest magnitude increase for the entire equitization program aiming at 
the plan of 5,250 eligible SOEs as the equitization in the period from 1992 to 2010. As 
can be seen from the Table 4, the year 2005 witnessed the peak record of the equitized 
SOEs number of 1032, which was partially the positive consequence of the high 
economic growth rate GDP and the boom of FDI fund mobilization into domestic 
economy. However, the equitized firms sharply went down from 1032 in year 2005 to 
294 in year 2006. This phenomenon resulted from some causes of limited scope and 
effectiveness of the enterprise reform policies and the distress of the economy recently 
from external and internal fluctuations. During the period from 2006 to 2008, Vietnam 
had challenged the high inflation rate caused by the ineffective investments by a lots 
of large SOEs as well as the ineffective monetary policies and lag time effect of the 
policies; this dampened the economic growth by the inflation rate of 8.4% in 2005; 
and 6.6% in 2006, much higher than that of the previous years.  
31 
 
The inflation rates even became seriously higher throughout years 2007 and 
2008 at the rates of 12.63% and 19.89% respectively. This is considered one of the 
major causes for the downturn trend of equitized number of SOEs (only 116 in 2007 
and 74 in 2008). As a result, a lot of investors have pumped too much money into the 
circulation while collecting little in return. For the past few years, many equitized 
government-owned corporations and business groups have developed investment 
projects outside their core business sectors. For instance, the Vietnam Power Energy 
Group is actively operating in the fields of real estate, telecommunication, and security 
exchange; the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group is investing in many projects in 
steel manufacturing, capital finance and assets investment and so on. Some other 
corporations also wanted to jump into electricity, banking and financial sectors, from 
which they are not specialized to operate and monitor as they have been authorized in 
the first place.  
At the early 2008, the Prime Minister chaired a meeting in which he ordered 
SOEs and relevant provincial authorities to strictly delay or cancel the non-urgent and 
non-effective investment projects, instead, to use this investment capital and funds for 
current developing key and effective projects. Projects about to be finished or those on 
commodity productions should be facilitated and put into operation as soon as 
possible. For this reason, SOEs were required to focus on their core business 
operations, of which investments in non-core operations must be under 30 per cent of 
the total investment since April, 2008. 
In 2007, the Government had just conducted the equitization for 116 SOEs, out 
of 271 reformed SOEs. At the same pace, the number of equitized firms was 74 out of 
246 eligible SOEs listed in the year plan (only ¼ of the plan). This can be estimated as 
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the low speed of implementation due to the dampened effects of high inflation, 
securities market bubble and downturn, and the global financial crisis at the second 
half of 2008. From data released by the Ministry of Finance, the total reformed 
enterprises up to the end of 2008 are 5,414, of which the equitized ones are 3,758, 
accounting for 69.4 percent which is observed to be low in the process. The percentage 
of the equitized enterprise in the total SOEs is 60.6 percent (3,758 equitized SOEs 
divided by 6,200 SOEs in total).  
Although these equitized enterprises have increased productivity and profits 
compared with pre-equitization process, these reformed SOEs are generally small or 
less possibility of making much profit than other large SOEs. Due to the slow progress 
of the equitization program, in the period of 2008 – 2010, the Government approved 
the new schedule to reform 1,535 SOEs, of which 950 SOEs are planned to be 
equitized in order to complete the entire program, rather than the expected number of 
more than 2,400 SOEs which was in the initial scheme released in 1996. What it 
means is that the Government adjustably puts the aim at keeping the remaining 1,500 
SOEs after the year 2010. Equitizing 950 SOEs within only 2 years seems to be a 
critically challenging, even an impossible mission as in the context of gradualism in 
overall program. 
The Ministry of Finance claimed in its reports submitting to the Government 
that the key reason for restraining equitization progress in 2008 was the depressing 
economic situation due to the high inflation and global financial crisis, and fluctuating 
security exchange market, thus, SOEs reform and equitization program has been 
affected recently. They admitted that this process, especially the equitization for large 
size enterprises and corporations had not been completed in accordance with the 
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settled plan due to the unexpectedly derivative issues without officially concrete 
guidance. For example, there are hardship in valuating firm’s brand name, land 
ownership valuation, geographic position, and business value, and selection of 
strategic investors. The process of carrying out those problems is perplexing and 
taking time in request of relevant agencies’ approval before making decisions. 
The works for the equitization in some units were not well-prepared enough. 
This caused the fact that in some corporations, the mother company completed its 
equitization while its subsidiaries have not done yet. Moreover, the indecisive 
management along with formalism and low consensus in managing board and labors 
also bring such disputes, claims or complaints in several companies. 
Another shortcoming is the inactive handling of financial remaining problems, 
like bad debts, non-performing loans; abundant labor force, and thus bringing lasting 
and complicated issues for implementing the equitization process. Besides, the 
program consultancy service agencies in Vietnam is less experienced and incompetent 
in the issuance of large scale of stocks, designing and choosing strategic investors, or 
financial and capital management while the number of foreign consultancy institutions 
in Vietnam is limited. Even some SOEs managers still considered equitization 
program questionable and infeasible, with the fears of creating state asset leakage or 
legal sues from labor or local relevant authorities during this process. 
These following figures and tables describe the equitized SEOs structure 
characterized by economic sector and administrative perspective in Vietnam. These 
might help to understand distinct features of the Vietnam’s program depending on the 
differential economic structure mainly focusing on industry and construction. 
Figure 1:  Equitized SOEs by economic structure up to December, 31st, 2005 
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Source: National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development 
(NSCERD) 
Figure 1 points out the portion of SOEs classified by economic structure 
comprising agriculture, industry, and services were settled in the equitization process. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of every different component of the equitized SOEs. In 
general, the majority firms come from the industry, transportation and construction, 
accounting for 66 percent. The next goes to the trading and services sector with 28 
percent, only 6 percent of firms in the sector of agriculture, forestry and fishery were 
equitized. This implies the stronger flow of equitization in the industry and 
construction sector which means the main components in the country’s 
industrialization and modernization process under the State and Communist Party’s 
guidance and policies. This seems to be rational in the context of Vietnamese economy 
with high GDP rates during this phase in reality. 
 
 
 
 
Equitized SOEs categorized by economic structure up to December, 31st, 2005
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Figure 2: Proportion of equitized SOEs by administrative units up to 2005 
 
Source: Report by the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and 
Development (NSCERD) 
Table 5: Number of equitized SOEs by administrative agency up to 2005 
 Equitized SOEs Percentage (%) 
Total 3274 100
Ministries, economic sectors 950 29
Corporations 91 295 9
Municipal and local provinces 2029 62
 
Table 6: Number of reformed and equitized SOEs calculated up to Dec., 31st, 2008 
 Reformed SOEs Equitized SOEs Percentage (%) 
Total 5,414 3,758 100
Ministries, economic sectors 1,354 1,145 30.47
Corporations 91 554 425 11.31
Municipal and local provinces 5,506 2,188 58.22
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2009 
Proportion of equitized SOEs categorized by administrative 
units up to Dec, 31st, 2005
Corporations 91
9%
Ministries 
29% 
Central cities, 
provinces 62%  
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The Table 5 and Table 6 show the proportion of administrative agencies by 
which the equitized SOEs (accumulative number) were managed in 2005 and 2008 
(Equitized SOEs included in reformed ones). This is classified in three sectors of 
administrative agencies: ministries and economic sectors; Corporation 91; Municipal 
and local provinces. Corporation 91 is the government-owned-companies in several 
different aspects of the economy, of which comprise Mother Company and several 
subsidiaries called daughter companies. Vietnam has 17 Corporations 91 distributed in 
diversified sectors (construction, natural mineral resources, industry, agriculture and 
services). Six of them had been transferred to economic groups which classify Mother 
Company and its subsidiaries to be independent entities, where the mother company is 
limitedly responsible for chartered capital invested into its subsidiaries to distribute 
business risks.  
The two tables underline that the central cities, municipal agencies and local 
provinces are the majority in managing the equitized SOEs business. In the year 2005, 
the central cities, municipal agencies managed the SOEs business after the equitization 
accounting for 62% of total equitized while in 2008, this number decreased by 4% to 
58.22% out of the total equitized firms. On the other hand, the equitized SOEs 
managed by the ministries and economic sectors increased from 29% to 30.47% in 
2005 and 2008 respectively. Noticeably, the percentage of equitized firms operated in 
the Corporations 91 increased from 9% in 2005 to 11.31% in 2008 recently, implying 
that the Government has expanded and transferred its guidelines of equitization in 
more strategic companies, to be more precise written, large size companies and 
national economic groups. 
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3.2. Performance of SOEs in the post - equitization period 
Even though the policy for equitization program was initially launched in 1992, 
the implementation was practically and strongly adapted with increasing number of 
equitized enterprises six years later, in 1998. After 16 years of implementation from 
1992 to 2008, the equitization in Vietnam had improved the firm’s performance. Since 
the adaption of equitization policy for state-owned-enterprises, Vietnam’s growth of 
firms has significantly increased with better operations and positive outcomes. From 
the annual reports of Ministry of Planning and Investment, the profitability, efficiency, 
and revenues of equitized companies have significantly increased after equitization. 
One major reason for this improvement is that these transformed SOEs are mostly 
small or loss-making ones with the aim at accelerating the SOEs reform. 
Undoubtedly, equitization program has improved the efficiency and productivity 
of firms’ performance. The equitization has helped the state enterprises gain flexibility 
in its operation and management decision for the firms’ development. The equitized 
SOEs made the turning point for the publicly trading transactions of stocks upon 
security market principles.  
Despite certain existing shortcomings, most of the state equitized enterprises 
have worked effectively, increasing their corporate tax payment to the state budget. 
After being equitized, the firms have maintained the stable annual growth and 
continued to develop its business performance consecutively. Particularly, from the 
evaluation of the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and 
Development (NSCERD) made in 2005, the SOEs in post-equitization have improved 
their productivity and efficiency at different levels. According to relevant reports from 
many ministries and local authorities conducted within around 850 equitized firms 
which have been on process over 1 year, the average charter capital increased by 44%, 
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average sales increased by 23.6%, average performed profits increased by 139.76%. In 
particular, more than 90% of the equitized enterprises have made profits and 
contributed to the state budget with 24.9% increase. Additionally, the average labor 
income increased by 12%, labor force increased 6.6% and average dividend yield is 
17.11%. 
The followings are some effectiveness and also consequences of firms’ 
performance after equitization. The first key impact of this process is the resolution 
with the poor performance of several enterprises remained in the pre-equitization. The 
second positive result is the reduction of state capital ownership in the equitized SOEs. 
Thirdly, the adverse consequence goes next to be the better but unsteady mobilization 
of capital from domestic and foreign investors. Finally, the corporate governance of 
equitized companies have been intensively and expansively enhanced, yet, in need of 
improvement to a certain extent in some fields such as human resources, financial 
management, and other internal transactions. 
First of all, in order to evaluate the impact of equitization on the business 
performance, the overall picture of SOEs production and business operation before 
applying the program needs to be presented. From some recent surveys on the SOEs, it 
is noted that the performance of SOEs (both large and small size ones) was getting 
poor. While the sales and growth indicators pointed out a steady increase, the 
profitability of most SOEs tended to a substantial downturn with a half of SOEs in red. 
12 out of the 17 largest conglomerates that accounted for 50% of total SOEs’ capital 
and asset were in profit loss or breaking even. A survey conducted by the Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Finance and IMF in 1997 showed that among 5,800 SOEs (calculated in 
1997), only 40 percent were reported to be productive and making profit, 44 percent 
were temporary loss-makers, and 16 percent were in the status of permanently profit 
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loss (Mekong Economics, 2002).  
Two major reasons for the weak performance of Vietnamese SOEs were given 
explaining for this period. The first reason is that Vietnam’s comparative advantages of 
import-substituting SOEs in some industries were not well-functioning for business 
and financial operations. The other one is that Vietnamese SOEs did challenge some 
soft budget constraints. In fact, several loss-making SOEs had been subsidized through 
the non-performing loans and cash injections from the state-owned banks, the National 
Investment Assistance Fund, Social Security Funds, and other sources (Mekong 
Economics, 2002). 
The situation has turned differently in the post-equitization, which can be 
expressed in the reports of relevant ministries and surveys on the enterprise’s 
performance in the process of transformation. A recent nationwide survey on 261 
equitized enterprises in 2007 carried out by the Central Institute of Economic 
Management (CIEM) showed that equitization has positively affected the firms’ 
general performance, and restructuring process. The majority of owners pointed out 
that their financial performance had improved after the equitization process, of which 
87.53% assumed that their financial performance was better or much better. Only 
8.62% of enterprises considered their financial situation having no change. The 
proportion of enterprises that performed less efficiently after the equitization was very 
small, with 3.17% considering that their financial situation was worse and the only 
0.68% enduring a worse financial situation than in the pre-equitization period. This 
clearly shows a strongly positive result for equitization. 
Many diverse business lines of firms’ performance and privatization 
restructuring of surveyed companies are shown in Tables 7 and Table 8. 
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Table 7: Evaluation on of the firms’ performance criteria 
Performance index Significantly 
more 
More Unchanged Less Significantly 
less 
Salary/bonus of Managers 2.59 78.24 17.10 2.07 0.00
Salary/bonus of employees 2.62 80.10 15.71 1.57 0.00
Other benefits of employees 1.27 62.42 26.11 7.64 2.55
Worker skills and technology 6.63 62.76 30.61 0.00 0.00
Incentives of employees 12.11 76.84 10.00 0.53 0.53
Profit sensitivity of managers 17.80 79.58 2.09 0.52 0.00
Capacity utilization 13.33 77.95 7.18 1.54 0.00
Source: Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) 
 From the above criteria, the firm’s business indexes are evaluated get more 
improvements. Especially, the wages paid to managing board and laborers are much 
higher than that in the prior pace. What it means is that equitization has played an 
important role in the dramatic raise in labor’s income after the process. In addition, 
equitization encourages employees and managers with physical and legal facilities or 
any conditions to improve their ownership and management.  
The significant improvements in profitability and efficiency may be explained 
by incentive effect of the income rises that stimulates the employees to work more 
efficiently. Noticeably, the capacity utilization of resources, competency of leader and 
workers is getting better, showing the more advanced managing activities and better 
and more strategic leadership of the enterprises. 
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Table 8: Subjective evaluation on firm restructuring 
Restructuring criteria Complete 
change 
Major 
change
Considerable 
change 
Any 
change 
No change
Market/product structure 0.00 4.15 20.73 62.18 12.95
Technology/production 0.00 6.35 25.93 55.03 12.70
Product quality 0.52 7.33 41.36 43.98 6.81
Source: Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) 
Product quality is considerably improved with high rate of evaluation from the 
firms themselves. The market, product structure and technology have been changed 
positively at major percentage, showing a turning point for the technology and 
production advancement after the adopted equitization. 
Another impact of equitization is the reduction of the state capital ownership in 
most of equitized SOEs. The state has still owned big stake in firm’s capital, hence, the 
proportion has been much reduced since the pilot phase of equitization transformation.  
From the report of NSCERD in 2005, the portion and separation of state capital 
value are shown in each firm accounting for the total number of equitized SOEs. 
Figure 3: Proportion of equitized SOEs divided by state capital up to 2005/12/31 
  
Proportion of equitized SOEs categorized by the state 
capital up to Dec, 31st, 2005
>10 Billion VND
23%
5-10 Billion VND 
23%
<5 Billion VND 
54%
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Source: Report by the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and 
Development (NSCERD) 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of the state capital invested in the equitized firms 
at late 2005. Every single firm’s total asset and capital held by the government which 
is less than 5 VND billion (equal to more than USD 300,000) occupy for 54 percent 
(more than a half). State capital of more than VND 10 billion and in the span of VND 
5 to 10 billion account for the same percentages of 23 percent respectively.  
In the structure of chartered capital of the corporate in the year 2008, the state 
owns the dominant percentage of capital in equitized SOEs. There are 33 percent of 
equitized SOEs with the state prominent capital of more than 50 percent; 37 percent of 
firms hold less than 50 percent of state capital and 30 percent for no state capital at all. 
The total equitized state capital nationwide accounted for 12 percent, in which the 
Government possessed the enormous proportion of 40 percent. 
This data implies that the state capital represented in the equitized firms has 
reduced in terms of magnitude (less than VND 5 billion equivalent to around USD 
300,000 at current price) and in terms of voting rights or equity ownership. In other 
words, the Government tends to decline its ownership and to give the labors and 
managing board more discretionary power and autonomy in leading their own 
companies as well as more obligations for the firms’ production. 
The third effect from the equitization program is the better but unsteady 
mobilization of capital from domestic and foreign investors. During 13 years of 
equitization from 1992 to 2005, the total investment mobilized from non-state sources 
was around VND 12,411 billion (equivalent to US$ 0.8 billion at current exchange 
rate). Researches of CIEM studied that approximate VND 190,000 billion (US$ 12 
billion) flowed into registered private firms between 1992 and 2003, of which USD 
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9.5 billion was mobilized into this type of enterprise in the period from 2000 to 2003 
in accordance with the implementation of the Business Law which was taken into 
effect from January, 1st, 2000. 
The equitization program was expected to get achievements and to a certain 
extent reached some satisfactory results as parts of the schedule. Creating a new type 
of enterprise comprising varying ownerships of different types of owners or 
stakeholders, this policy has thoroughly noted as the most critical solution for 
restructuring SOEs and for mobilizing more capital and assets from the public through 
stock exchange and partnership investors into business expansion.  
Before the year 2007, the equitization implementation was almost ignored in the 
procedure of attachment with the listing in the stock market. That discouraged not only 
the inflows direct capital but also portfolio capital from investors into the prospective 
equitized SOEs and equitized SOEs. The function of representing for the state capital 
ownership upon corporations and economic groups was still not focused, even 
distracted, which had the negative impacts on the state shareholder’s rights at these 
units.  
Also, the equitization has not been successful in mobilizing new sources of 
funds due to the reason that certain SOEs eligible to be on the process were limited in 
scale, expansion probability, and also profitability. Hence, potential investors and 
security market partners will be less willing to put more capital flows into these 
enterprises.  
Finally, the corporate governance of equitized companies like the economic 
groups; large and medium enterprises (LME) has been soundly enhanced. Yet, it is 
necessary for much improvement in human resources, financial management, and 
other internal transactions. The process of this policy adoption provides firms with 
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more dynamic and open-minded leadership and progressive corporate governance to 
obtain better efficiency and adaptability of free market economy. Moreover, that also 
creates more opportunities for adequate and overall supervision as well as 
consciousness of the laborers as being the enterprise’s owners towards equitized firms, 
particularly the listing companies in the security market. In this case, the equitized 
firms should be financially transparent and publicized to every stakeholder and 
potential investors.  
Economic groups (Corporations) and large companies has classified Mother 
Company and its subsidiaries to be independent entities, where the mother company is 
limitedly responsible for chartered capital invested into its subsidiaries to distribute 
business risks. The mother company does not dominate its subsidiaries and take any 
responsibilities on behalf of governing body as it used to be. Subsidiaries get the rights 
of being autonomous and promoting their best capability of production, labor force 
and financial resources in business, and also take obligations of their performances.  
The mother companies of state economic groups have their board of directors. 
The law regulates the amount of this board consisted of 5-9 people. In practice, this 
number ranges from 7-9 people. Members of this board are appointed directly by the 
Prime Minister upon the request from the ministry in charge which has been inspected 
in terms of procedures, documents, standards, and conditions for appointment by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.  
Nevertheless, due to the new economic group models and the long period 
performance of the frank gap between “superior and subordinate” levels in business, 
both parent and subsidiary companies are not able to adapt rapidly as the economic 
group model was transformed. The mother company’s managing board has still kept 
old-fashioned methods of managing its subsidiaries as “superior and subordinate” 
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awareness without any intensive consideration and adequate obedience of subsidiaries’ 
regulations for investigation and observation. As a result, some senior officers’ 
activities seem likely to be orders, lack of instruction or support for the subsidiaries as 
share holders or direct managers for the business performance without announcing or 
reporting to the representatives of parent firm at that subsidiary. 
In particular, regarding to the equitized economic groups and corporations’ 
performance, there have generally been inadequate regulations which are not 
particularly applied for economic groups but generally for all types of enterprises. 
There are some reasons explaining for the unclear concretization of some problems 
such as: incorporated and discrepant internal relationships including internal 
transactions; Inconsistent information for all the system, mutual benefit division, 
responsibility mechanism, promotion activity cooperation among member enterprises 
of the EGs; unsystematic supervision activities of the State toward EGs about 
monopoly, economic-sector concentration. 
3.3. Remaining problems in the post-equitization process 
The Vietnam’s equitization program has been progressing for the last 16 years. 
This process has contributed to the economic growth and been the core factor in 
making the economic transition in Vietnam. The program has been challenging and 
overcome a range of difficulties since its application in 1992 despite the Asian 
financial crisis and the current global economic crisis. However, the equitization 
program has remained some critical problems and weaknesses that should be dealt 
with. The first is the improper orientation of program’s objectives and guidance in 
diversifying firms’ ownership (with extensive participation of laborers). The next one 
is the undervaluation of asset, accounting clarity and budget constraints. Thirdly, 
incompetence in corporate governance in equitized firms. The fourth is the unsteady 
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pace of process expressed by slow implementation of equitization. Finally, the 
Government still acquires high stake of equity in firm’s ownership structure. 
At the first place, the core and implicit philosophy of ownership structure 
diversification is the approval for laborers to ‘play the role of the true capital owners’ 
and to ‘facilitate social overlook of a firm’s performance’ in order to ensure efficient 
utilization of state assets and to mobilize new capital and investment from the private 
and public society. This philosophy is much in accordance with socialism orientation, 
and an effective means by which to justify the equitization indeed. 
Nevertheless, the aim of ownership diversification has so far been misleading. A 
more appropriate rationale for equitization should be the allocation of public resources 
to those who value them most and, therefore, will utilize them in the most efficient 
manner. In transition economies, insider-owners (managers and workers) are among 
the least effective types of ownership classes in terms of post-privatization 
restructuring. These findings are particularly obvious in Vietnam’s case because of the 
inconsistent and weak legal system, leading to the fact that the rights of minority 
shareholders are not reasonably guaranteed. The Vietnam’s index of Protection of 
minority shareholders meaning the protection of interests for minority shareholders of 
equitized companies on average ranks 75 with the score of 4.4, lower than the world’s 
mean score 4.6 (Global Competiveness Index  report 2009). 
Restricted prudential and discreet supervision and management for economic 
groups and corporations, or any detailed regulations, especially for monitoring the 
State’s benefits, limit of monopoly or market dominance abuse, there is no base to 
control performance objectives, investment structure and main sectors of the State’s 
EGs and corporations to become national economic key enterprises; besides, to ensure 
the strategic fields, the national economic security such as gas and oil, energy, non-
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regenerated mineral resources etc.  
Secondly, the valuation of firms which are subjective to be in equitization is a 
problem in every economy activating with rapid changes at different periods, 
especially the case of Vietnamese economy. The matter of undervaluation seemed to 
be more pronounced in the earlier stage of equitization while the economy changed 
fast as well as while assets and liabilities accounting standards and methods for firm 
evaluation were missed or inconsistent. The valuation has been now conducted by 
external consultants since 2005 after the abolishment of an incompetent governmental 
committee. The price recommended by those consultants is likely to be the reference, 
and might be changed by purchasers. 
In general, the time duration needed from the Decision for equitizing company 
to date for the equitization is fully implemented is on average at 15 months. 
Restructuring of the firm comprises the change of management, reconstruction of bad 
debts, on-performed debts, and layoff of redundant labor. Basically, the government is 
responsible for taking over bad debt if it considered as the victims of exogenous and 
endogenous incidents; however, the authority is not completely encouraged by the 
superior agencies or willing to do that activity if the debts are considered to be 
consequences of the firm’s own performance. In practice, the methods of how to 
handle problems and the outcomes seem to originate from a bunch of other factors, 
such as firms’ size, controlling holder’s position within the state sector, and by 
demands from potential buyers. 
Moreover, there is a substantial problem of asymmetric information between 
internal partners of managers, board of directors and external partners, regarding to the 
real value and post revenue prospects of the equitized firms. Consequently, equitized 
SOEs have been undervalued or imprecisely evaluated for the process of equitization. 
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Additionally, the official reports from Ministry of Planning and Investment point 
out an increase in the enterprise’s leverage ratio in the post-equitization period despite 
its statistically insignificant. Leverage shows the degree of utilizing borrowed money 
by an investor or business. This is measured by the ‘debt-to-equity’ ratio as the firm's 
total liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity (Wikipedia’s definition). This means the 
ineffective utilization of the invested capital and assets in some enterprises, which can 
reduce owners and investors’ confidence and discourage potential partnership from 
consideration of investment opportunities.  
Thirdly, the state has still acquired large equity proportion among the firms. This 
sounds no substantial difference from the status in the pre-equitization, which lacks 
definite and official distinctions of the state management and ownership as the 
Government plays the roles of both the firm’s dominant shareholder and the regulator. 
And yet, the ownership of majority supplies the state with the veto power in most 
crucial organizational decisions.  
Another remaining shortcoming is the institutional capacity of authority’s 
agency in charge of controlling state capital with tight budget and being the 
government representative in terms of capital ownership of lots amount of equitized 
firms. Consequently, despite being a large capital and asset holder for several 
privatized firms, the Government has less probability to facilitate any adequate and 
precise management outlook and perspectives. While workers usually have weaker 
voice in running the company, controlling board might receive discretionary power, 
which seems to be easily taken advantage to gain individual unethical benefit. 
The discipline of managers can be improved by the collaboration of emphasized 
ownership, a well-functioning securities market, and a rational legal system, thereby to 
enhance firms’ performance. Sufficiently to say that Vietnamese legal system is 
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evaluated to be inconsistent and vulnerably affected with restricted opportunities for 
firm managers for the purpose of governance. 
In the large corporations or economic groups, some subsidiaries’ managing 
boards have lack of competence or experience in monitoring investment, financing 
activities or internal administration etc when acting as independent accounting units 
because they were operated as the subsidized administration model for a long period, 
then they are quite puzzled at the beginning of mechanism transformation, in some 
cases, they were afraid to make decisions for even investment projects on which they 
had been authorized to make decision. On the contrary, the reporting and requests of 
mother company’s capital representatives’ advices or opinions about projects, senior 
personnel and organizational activities in some subordinate companies are 
incompletely followed, this reduces the effectiveness of supervision and investigation 
of parent companies toward subsidiaries through their representatives. 
The fourth is the low and unsteady pace of process expressed by speed 
implementation of the equitization program. In the year 2007, only 116 SOEs were 
equitized, reaching 21 percent of the plan approved by the Prime Minister. The number 
of equitized firms in 2008 reached only 74, accounting for 25 percent of the plan (total 
262 SOEs). In comparison with that of 2007 and earlier years, this number in 2008 is 
the lowest so far, which means the equitization process still faces a lots of challenges 
to obtain its aims. This situation is caused by risky debts or non-performing loans of 
the SOEs. The dealing with overdue loans has been taken slowly and suspended for 
several times. Big corporations, especially the Governmental corporations 91 get the 
state backup to delay or postpone the payment of expired loans or bad debts to the 
commercial banks. 
From Table 4, the accumulated number of equitized SOEs from 1992 to 2008 is 
50 
 
3758, showing that the speed of this program is steadily low. This total number is 
regarded as modest magnitude increase for the entire equitization program aiming at 
the plan of 5,250 eligible SOEs as the equitization in the period from 1992 to 2010. 
What this means is that the number of firms has been completed accounting for only 
about 72 percent in 16 year period, while there still remains approximately 28 percent 
of the total number for just only 2 years left of the whole plan (2009-2010). 
The facts also show that the reluctance and indecisiveness of several SOEs, 
especially strategic and key – sector enterprises have strongly affected the 
implementation speed of equitization. This caused other subsidiaries and same – sector 
firms tend to delay for a long period for listing IPO in security exchange market. 
Finally, the Government has still obtained high portion of equity in the firm’s 
ownership structure. Shareholders are divided into three groups comprising state, 
internal partners (employees), and external partners (domestic and foreign investors). 
In Vietnam, the portion of state ownership is still very high in compared with other 
countries.  
This following table shows the ownership structure of equitized SOEs in 
Vietnam in 2004 in comparison with other countries which have implemented 
privatization process. 
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Table 9: Ownership structure of equitized SOEs in Vietnam (2004)  
and some transition nations (1997) (%) 
 
Country State Insiders Outsiders 
Vietnam (2004) 38.1 46.5 15.4 
Georgia (1997) 23.3 64.4 12.4 
Kazakhstan (1997) 16.1 37.6 46.3 
Kyrgyz Republic (1997) 5.6 70.8 23.6 
Moldova (1997) 23.8 38.0 38.2 
Russia (1997) 14.7 59.6 25.7 
Ukraine (1997) 15.4 61.5 23.1 
Source: Nguyen (2005) and computed from Djankov (1999)  
The table 9 shows that the Vietnamese state acquired 38.1 percent, more than 1/3 
of SOEs’ gross value after the equitization. This number expresses that Vietnam 
government ranks the first in ownership of corporate among 7 countries in comparison 
as mentioned in the above table. In addition, in Vietnam case the outsiders, meaning 
the domestic and foreign investors own fewer equities in one firm than the 
opportunities and feasibility they possibly get in other countries. 
In conclusion, the state keeps a remarkable stake in equitized firms, particularly 
in big-size and profitability firms. The high ratio of this sort of ownership is not 
surprising in the case of Vietnam, because regarding to the Decision 58/2002/QD-TTg 
approved by the Prime Minister on April 26th, 2002, the state is required to have over 
50 percent of the total finance in such corporate with aggregate chartered capital of 10 
billion dong and earning returns during three consecutive years. In these firms, 
common external investors might be challenged to purchase a crucial number of shares, 
or limited amount of equity for regulation of restrictive trading toward outsider. What 
it implies is that employees of these firms, public official involved with firms and their 
family, friends are the main shareholders of the firms instead. 
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Chapter 4. CONCLUSION 
The Vietnam’s SOEs equitization has been one of the most important policies 
since the early 1990s. This policy has been employed since 1992 in line with the 
reform process of the centrally planned economy into the market economy in Vietnam. 
So far, Vietnam has witnessed the significant growth of business community 
nationwide in different aspects with better operation and positive achievements after 
sixteen years of the policy adoption. 
The policy has achieved many spectacular accomplishments of enterprise’s 
effectiveness and performance. The SOEs equitization has dramatically changed the 
former structure and business operation of the enterprises in Vietnam since its 
application. A lot of enterprises have been increasing their performance of business 
and profits compared with the pre-equitization process. The equitization’s 
achievements have benefited enterprise community and the Vietnam’s economy. In 
the post-equitization, the remarkable growth in profitability, productivity, as well as 
competitiveness, and management capacity are notably observable in the Vietnamese 
equitized enterprises. 
Nonetheless, despite the interests in equitization program, the progress has been 
modest than what it was supposed to achieve at the first place. In terms of the 
magnitude, the quantity of equitized firms so far is lower than it was set in the 
program schedule due to the steady speed of the process, while in terms of the 
performance, the firms’ business has not been effectively operated at desirably 
expected level to earn preferable and desirable results. 
The policies relative to the equitization have still contained some limitations to 
be modified and covered to gain better-functioning performance of enterprise’s 
productivity and finance; and to improve the efficiency for the economic growth in 
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different periods of time.  
The first considerable shortcoming is interpreted that the Government has 
strived to speed up the program, yet in a gradually slow pace, which brings the 
unsteady process expressed by slow implementation of equitization with few 
satisfactory achievements.  
Secondly, the newly–formed enterprises have not been such successful in 
mobilizing much potential and hidden capital resources from the domestic savings and 
foreign investment due to the high rate of inflation and regulated constraints of 
ownership restriction for the external-organization partnership.  
The third is the undervaluation of asset, capital and real estate, the less 
transparent firm’s finance, which caused the inadequate transparency and budget 
constraints for the companies as well as the ineffectiveness of utilizing the enterprises’ 
capital. This is also correlated to the slow speed and hesitance of the program adoption 
and implementation.  
Another limitation is the in incompetence of the corporate management in the 
equitized firms along with the discrepant compromise and inconsistent administration 
capacity of executive board of the enterprise. Board of managers is occasionally seen 
as administrative constraints to the improvement of the firms’ business. The study 
shows that in many enterprises, the executive board is deeply dependent on the board 
of directors that occasionally delivers vague and cumbersome decisions for production 
and financial management. Transparency in the executive board in most firms is not 
really considered and the companies have been controlled by a minority of large 
capital-shareholders.  
Finally, in comparison with other countries which have the same process of 
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privatization, the Vietnamese government still holds larger stake in the firm’s 
ownership. The number of firms that have been equitized is rather impressive, yet 
these firms are about to be small in terms of scale. Consequently, the stake obtained by 
the state in the economy has not reduced so much in the sense of ownership and 
controlling power.  
Research on SOEs equitization policies has been currently necessary to 
recommend solutions for strengthening these policies in the process of investment 
mobilization from varying sources. Mobilizing investment from domestic and foreign 
sectors has become a competitive challenge in the international trade and globalization, 
particularly for the transition economy in Vietnam with open market.  
Therefore, enhancing this equitization policy would improve the efficiency and 
implementation speed of the program and should be taken as rapid as possible. 
Additionally, studying the findings and lessons from other countries’ experiences 
might possibly be a useful solution for such shortcomings. Thereby, the study 
introduced some specific recommendations for the improvement of the policies in 
facilitating SOEs productivity and business performance as well as to the policy 
makers in enhancing equitization program in Vietnam. 
First of all, one implication is that transparency of management should be 
improved with the involvement of many independent owners in the executive board to 
monitor the company’s business performance. Accordingly, executive board should 
work independently and conduct their authorized and legal rights as well as 
responsibilities in running the enterprises. Transparency can be explained in less room 
for corruption, publicity of financial statement and stock listing on the security 
exchange to avoid the information asymmetries; besides, the responsive and active 
coordination among the managing boards will work in enhancing the transparent 
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management, this can be improved by employing the tight supervision and periodical 
inspection on the organizational behavior.  
Secondly, in general, the improvement of political will, efforts and guidance for 
a strategic equitization is definitely important to sustain equitization progress and to 
keep it on the right path in line with its supreme purposes and its role in the economy. 
In other words, the pragmatic and timely policies granted by the Government are able 
to overcome obstacles in the programs, despite the process remains apparent the same. 
The political aspiration in parallel with the intensive economic analysis would better 
back the concepts that the state limits and decreases its reach in aspects which business 
or markets are possible to get them done. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to improve corporate governance and help develop 
corporate governance skills towards the world’s standards, in which to clarify the 
current Vietnamese legal system related to the governance and supervision of state 
economic groups, large-scale state enterprises, and monopoly state enterprises. In 
addition, a fundamental principle of corporate governance is the protection for minorit
y shareholders. Once minority shareholders get adequate rights, they will facilitate and 
devote their contribution to the effective operation of their companies. Besides, regulat
ions and rights protection reduce perceived risks to less-powered or outside investors, 
especially when they have less opportunity to access necessary information and no con
trol over management. In addition, in Vietnam’s case, the ownership structure plays an 
important role in performance improvements of firms after employing the equitization 
program, thus, enhancing the ownership structure diverting to the external partners can 
be one helpful solution for the corporate governance. 
Fourthly, the Government needs to promulgate policies to reduce the disparity of 
common and preferred shares for laborers among equitized enterprises and to remove 
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constraints preventing potential investors and laborers from approaching to purchase 
equitized firms’ shares. Laborers might hold preferred shares in a pre-determined 
period of time. In addition, the amendment and supplementation of the priority 
mechanism of selling shares to laborers would deeply attract them to enterprises; and 
to sell an appropriate proportion of shares to outside buyers. Besides, expansion of the 
sale of shares of processing enterprises in agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture to 
material providers and producers would encourage equitized enterprises to be labor-
intensive, and allowing transforming debts into joint-stock capital. 
Fifthly, the improvement of economic efficiency through competitiveness 
promotion and business environment for equitized enterprises is the essential key 
factor in transforming the centrally planned into the market-oriented economy. Thus, 
the trade, regulatory reforms and competition policy in line with the free international 
trade and WTO regulations should be stimulated to create positively additional 
pressures and competition among these enterprises to speed up the program and to 
create a competitive environment for facilitating equitized SOEs to become more 
transparent in corporate governance and accountable in finance. Additionally, the 
probability of bank loan access should be unblocked and widened to create more 
opportunities of production expansion for the firms. 
Last but not least, the recommendation for a large scale survey about post-
equitized enterprise nationwide should be conducted. From this survey, such 
information including merge and acquisition, bankruptcy, financial capacity, stock 
issuing and labor distribution can be adequately supplied to improve the public 
awareness of the process and benefit from the equitization program. Another purpose 
is to avoid the remaining overlapping of statistics about equitized companies within 
the nation. 
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The above mentioned recommendations desirably aim at improving diverse 
factors which affect the implementation and performance of the equitization program 
in Vietnam. The improvements can be attributable to the Government sector and the 
equitized enterprise sector. The government is the main key in coordinating and 
supporting these enterprises to overcome challenges and remaining policy constraints. 
In parallel, the equitized firms themselves should play an active role and make more 
efforts to increase their competitiveness and performance by enhancing the corporate 
governance and production performance. From the analysis and implications, the 
equitization policy points to the necessity for further advancement and improvements 
of the policy adoption and implementation for the positive correlation between the 
equitization program and the Vietnam’s economic growth in the forthcoming stage. 
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Appendix: Government’s policies on Equitization program 
 
 
1996 
- Issuing Decree 28-CP in May, 1996 to finish the pilot stage and set a new stage of the 
equitization process.  
- Decree gives general principles of the pilot equitization program, and for extending 
scope of equitization to all non-strategic small and medium-sized SOEs 
- Creating conditions for the capital contributors and the employees in enterprises to 
own equities along with raising their role and giving a new impetus to enhance the 
enterprises’ business efficiency. 
1998 
- Issuing Decree 44 to simplify the process of equitization and allow limited foreign 
shareholding in equitized SOEs; 
- Issuing Directive 20 to adopt a wider menu of reform options for SOEs, e.g. outright 
sale, transfer to employees competitive bidding, for purchasing SOEs on SOE shares, 
leases, management contract etc.; 
- Announcing annual targets for equitization for 1998 – 2000; 
1999 
- Completing classification of SOEs into three groups: profitable, temporary loss-
makers and permanent loss-makers; 
- Issuing decree and regulations for outright sale, transfer to employees, and lease of 
small SOEs, without requiring conversion of SOEs into joint-stock companies as 
required for equitization; 
- Selecting 100 large troubled SOEs for independent diagnostic audits (i.e. operational 
reviews); 
2000 
- Selecting three general corporations (Seaprodex, Vinatex, and Vinacafe) for 
developing specific action restructuring plans and completing preliminary consultancy 
work; 
_ Expanding authority of provinces to decide on divestiture of SOEs with capital up to 
five billion VND instead of 1 billion permitted before; 
- Establishing an Assistance Fund for Restructuring and Equitizing SOEs to finance 
severance payments, early pension payments and retraining for redundant workers -- 
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minimizing the negative social impact of SOE reforms on workers; 
- Adopting a comprehensive five-year SOE-reform plan with annual target for the first 
three years. 
2001 
- Establishing a quarterly monitoring system for 200 large highly-indebted SOEs, and 
revising a decision to clarify reporting requirements and introducing sanctions against 
late reporting; 
- Issuing government’s instruction for a moratorium on establishing new SOEs by 
local People Committees and line ministries until further notice (Official Dispatch 
574/CP of June 25, 2001); 
- Establishing the Financial Investment Company under the Enterprise Law, to 
represent the interests of the State as owner and co-owner of SOEs and issuing decree 
63 on transforming SOEs into one member limited liability companies are steps 
towards disentangling the complex ties between Government and SOEs (October 
2001); 
2002 
- Issuing Decree 41/2002/ND-CP, April 2002 on the policies towards employees made 
redundant because of SOE reform. Allowing managers of equitizing enterprises to 
purchase shares in excess of the number of shares subscribed by employees, requiring 
30 days public notice prior to announcement of equitization, and clarifying potential 
conflicts between the SOE Law and the Enterprise Law; 
- Issuing Decree 64 on June, 19th, 2002 to replace the Decree 44 for strengthening the 
real ownership of employees and share-holders; also investor’s monitoring of the 
enterprise, as well as balancing the interests of the state, the enterprise, and the 
employees. 
2004 
Decree 187/2004/NĐ-CP on November, 16th, 2004 for transferring state owned firms 
to equitized SOEs. 
2007 
- Issuing the Decree 109/2007/NĐ-CP on transformation of 100% state capital 
enterprises into equitized ones on June, 6th, 2007, being the updated guiding 
instruction of legal document for equitization. 
- According to this Decree, an enterprise with 100% state capital must satisfy the two 
following conditions:  
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+ Being not an enterprise where the State holds 100% charter capital; and, 
+ Having state capital after handling financial matters and re-determining its 
value. 
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